Can an assignment of accounting debts within the meaning of Article 136(2)(a) be suspended? In the absence of a date, the service must be performed “within a reasonable time”, itself depending on the nature of the contract. Concrete Products vs. Natal Leather Industries[181] is the most important case for determining a reasonable period of time. In this case, the claimant agreed to sell the defendant a large number of steel corners for the suitcases of various sizes. The agreement provided that several thousand of each size were to be delivered each week and that the order of small corners was to be considered urgent. No deadline has been set for the start of delivery. The claimant did not provide the small corners, although the defendant insisted that the contract be performed. However, it sent medium coins that were contractually accepted by the defendant. Following the non-delivery of the small coins, the defendant informed the applicant of the cancellation approximately three weeks after the conclusion of the contract. Although the above definitions are generally accepted, a scientific debate is raging about the exact nature of release and renunciation. According to Kerr, this is a unilateral legal act. The power to exonerate a debtor from his obligation is entirely in the hands of the creditor, who only has to say: “I do not want to make use of this right” to terminate it. [Citation required] SW van der Merwe and his co-authors, on the other hand, assert in Contract: General Principles, that this is an exemption agreement, i.e.

a bilateral legal act that is not a treaty. [Citation required] HR Christie argues for a distinction based on circumstances. This is a rule: in the South African system, the rule is that the law of the treaty, whether correct or applicable, depends primarily on the express or tacit intention of the parties. Where the parties explicitly agree (usually through a “legal choice clause”) that their contract is governed by the law of a particular country, their choice usually takes precedence. In the absence of such an explicit agreement, there may nevertheless be circumstances in which a tacit choice of law can be inferred (e.g. B where the treaty deals with concepts specific to a particular system), but these cases are relatively rare. In accordance with ETF v Lynn 1996 (2) SA 339 A, our courts have so far adopted the approach that only existing rights can be assigned and not rights that are nothing more than an expectation or a spes. . . .