Hasan Afif El-Hasan says that in 1955-1956, the American offered Nasser to peacefully resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict in exchange to fund the High Nile Dam, but Nasser rejected the offer because it would mean siding with the West during the Cold War (instead of remaining neutral). With the alternative to a peace deal being a war with unpredictable consequences, Nasser`s refusal to accept the proposal is irrational, El-Hasan said. [113] 103 See “Turkey Iraq Pact Opens New Chapter in Mideast,” New York Times, News of the Week in Review, February 27, 1955, 5; March 3, 1955, p. 5. Iraq considers that its accession to the Turkish-Iraqi Pact is not incompatible with its obligations to the CPHA, and art. IV of the previous Agreement declares that the commitments entered into under the Pact are not contrary to the international commitments entered into by either Party with any third country. On November 7, David Ben-Gurion addressed the Knesset and declared a great victory by claiming that the 1949 ceasefire agreement with Egypt was dead and buried and that the ceasefire lines were no longer valid and could not be restored. This was a military defeat for Egypt, but Nasser`s status increased in the Arab world as a defender of Arab nationalism. Israel withdrew from Egyptian territory gained in the fighting, but regained access to the Strait of Tiran, while the United Nations played a larger role in maintaining a peacekeeping force in Sinai. .

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